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ARGUMENT

The June 25, 2015 Judgment was not a valid final judgment when it was entered.
Lanham takes

with one relatively insignificant paragraph

Appellate Brief. However, contrary to Judd Lanham's arguments, Thomas Lanham does not
assert that June 25, 2014 judgment is not a final judgment for purposes of this appeal. Instead,
Thomas Lanham attempts to point out how the characterization of the judgment/order at the time
the Motion for Reconsideration was filed is important for determining the applicable rule.
A Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration applies to: 1) interlocutory orders; and 2)
any order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment. In Boise lvfode, LLC v. Donahoe
Pace & Partners, LTD, this court added that the second type of motion to reconsider applies to

orders that are made "after entry of final judgment ... and pursuant to a party's Rule 59( e)
motion." 154 Idaho 99, 106 (2013 ). A motion to reconsider a final judgment is treated as a Rule
59(e) motion. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71 (2008). Additionally, the Idaho Court of
Appeals has held that a motion to reconsider a final judgment is timely and proper even when
made before the formal entry of judgment. Willis v. Larsen, l l O Idaho 818, 821 (Idaho App. Ct.
1986).
Although the Judgment entered June 25, 2014 is to be treated as a valid final judgment, it
was not a valid final judgment when it was entered. If not a final judgment, what was it? If
characterized as an interlocutory order, then the motion was timely filed before the entry of final
judgment. If characterized as a final judgment, the motion, albeit premature, was nonetheless
timely under IRCP 59(e), IRCP ll(a)(2)(B), and relevant case law.
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B.

Thomas Lanham had no obligation to file a notice of hearing with his motion.
Judd Lanham's assertion that Thomas Lanham was required to notice his motion

hearing is incorrect. See Marcher v. Butler, 133 Idaho 867, 869 (1988). In Marcher, a plaintiff
filed a motion to alter or amend judgment 14 days after the entry of judgment. Id. at 868. The
motion remained dormant for almost a year. Id. Eventually, both the plaintiff and defendant
filed memoranda in support and opposition to the motion. Id. The motion was denied and the
plaintiff appealed. Id. at 869. On appeal, the defendant argued that plaintiffs failure to notice
up the hearing was grounds for dismissal without notice, but the court disagreed. Id. There, the
court held that "the time for appealing the district court's summary judgment order was tolled by
[the plaintiffs] motion to alter or amend the judgment," and stated that pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 7(D) "the court may dismiss [a] motion without notice, [but it] clearly does not
require this, and does not even establish a time frame in which filed motions must be noticed up
for argument." Id.
In another case, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that " [w ]hether the trial court rules on
[a] motion within the forty-two day [appeals] period is not within the control of the party
bringing the motion; therefore that party should not be penalized should the district court fail to
act on the motion within the appeal period." Willis v. Larsen, 110 Idaho 818,822 (1986). In that
case, the motion for reconsideration was filed before the entry of final judgment. Id. at 821. In
drawing analogy to IAR 17(e)(2), the court stated, "We find that where, as here, judgment has
been pronounced in open court, requiring a litigant to wait to seek reconsideration until the court
clerk has file-stamped the formal judgment would be hypertechnical and violate the spirit of the
rules." Id.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a movant to file a notice of hearing.
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While written motions may be decided at a hearing, they may also be decided without a hearing
on memoranda submitted by the parties.

the plain meaning ofIRCP 7(b) only

that motions and notices of hearings be filed and served at least 14 days before a
hearing, if any. It does not require that a notice of hearing be filed. Idaho precedent
demonstrates that some motions can remain pending for extensive periods of time. Even so,
assuming arguendo, that the magistrate court "dismissed the motion without notice," the earliest
that it could have dismissed the motion is July 4, 2014, which would still mean that the appeal
was filed within the 42 day requirement. There is simply no requirement that Thomas Lanham
file a notice of hearing.

C.

Thomas Lanham's Motion for Reconsideration tolled the appeals period.
IRCP 83(e) suspends the time for filing an appeal where a party timely files one of the

following: 1) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; 2) a motion to amend or make
additional findings of fact or conclusions of law; 3) a motion to alter or amend the judgment; and
4) a motion for a new trial. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that both motions to reconsider
and motions to amend a judgment toll the time for filing an appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule
14(a). Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659,
661 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).

If characterized as a final judgment, Thomas Lanham' s motion for reconsideration tolls
the appeals period under IRCP 83(e)(3). Since Idaho Courts treat motions to reconsider final
judgments as both l l(a)(2)(B) and 59(e) motions, Thomas Lanham's motion for reconsideration
tolls the appeals period until the motion for reconsideration is denied. See Boise Mode, LLC v.

Donahoe Pace & Partners LTD, 154 Idaho 99, 106 (2013). Judd Lanham accurately points out
the erroneous citation ofIRCP 83(e)(2), where IRCP (e)(3) is clearly more applicable. However,
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since this is a question oflaw over which this court exercises free review, Judd Lanham's
"'=iivac

that

foundation.
D.

Judd Lanham is not entitled to attorney's fees.
This is a relatively novel issue for Idaho. In fact, this is likely a novel issue for most

states. See Street v. Street, 936 So. 2d 1002 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). In Mississippi, the court
followed the "settled" authority of the Federal Courts and held that a Rule 59(e) motion was
timely even though it was filed before the entry of final judgment. Id. at 1008-1009. Moreover,
the Idaho Court of Appeals has already held that premature motions for reconsideration are
timely in situations like this where the court's decision is declared in open court. Willis v.
Larsen, l l O Idaho 818, 822 (1986).

Judd Lanham ignores the weight of authority that holds that motions for reconsideration
may be filed before the formal entry of judgment. In doing so, Judd Lanham alleges that these
courts have reached "absurd" results and accuses Thomas Lanham of engaging in frivolous
conduct. However, other than pointing out an accidental citation to an ineffective version of
IRCP 54(a), Judd Lanham's accusations are baseless and without foundation. Thomas Lanham
has not engaged in any conduct that could be construed as frivolous.
On the other hand, Judd Lanham' s argument that Thomas Lanham needed to file a notice
of hearing is entirely without merit and directly contrary to the plain language of the rules and
established Idaho case law. Moreover, Judd Lanham's mischaracterization of several of Thomas
Lanham's arguments is troubling. To the extent that the court finds frivolous conduct, it should
award attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
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CONCLUSION
Thomas Lanham was not required to
and

timely motion

a notice

hearing on

the appeals period

motion

at very least 14

Therefore, Thomas Lanham respectfully requests that this court reverse and vacate the District
Court's Order Dismissing the appeal and vacate its award of attorney's fees.

DATED t h i s ~ day of October, 2015.
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